Marilag vs Martinez, GR 201892 (2015, First Division)
Facts:
Respondent filed his answer, 15
contending that petitioner has no cause of action against him. He
averred that he has fully settled Rafael's obligation and that he
committed a mistake in paying more than the amount due under the loan,
i.e., the amount of ₱229,200.00 as adjudged by the RTC-Imus in the
judicial foreclosure case which, thus, warranted the return of the
excess payment. He therefore prayed for the dismissal of the complaint,
and interposed a compulsory counterclaim for the release of the
mortgage, the return of the excess payment, and the payment of moral and
exemplary damages, attorney's fees and litigation expenses.
Issue:
WON CA is justified when it held that the doctrine of res judicata finds application in the instant case, 27 considering that both the judicial foreclosure and collection cases were filed as a consequence of the non-payment of Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation secured by the real estate mortgage and the primary consideration for the execution of the subject PN.
Ruling:
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.
While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note executed by respondent who was not the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of loan which would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are bereft of any indication that respondent's agreement to pay Rafael's loan obligation and the execution of the subject PN extinguished by novation 40 the contract of loan between Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or any act of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one, 41 which was not shown here.
On the contrary, it is significant to point out that: (a) the consideration for the subject PN was the same consideration that supported the original loan obligation of Rafael; (b) respondent merely assumed to pay Rafael's remaining unpaid balance in the latter's behalf, i.e., as Rafael's agent or representative; 42 and (c) the subject PN was executed after respondent had assumed to pay Rafael's obligation and made several payments thereon. Case law states that the fact that the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who has assumed the obligation, will result merely in the addition of debtors, not novation, and the creditor may enforce the obligation against both debtors.
As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in order. Considering, however, that respondent's claim for return of excess payment partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and, thus, survives the dismissal of petitioner's collection suit, the same should be resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
Facts:
Rafael failed to file his answer and, upon
petitioner's motion, was declared in default. After an ex parte
presentation of petitioner's evidence, the RTC-lmus issued a Decision 9
dated January 30, 1998, (January 30, 1998 Decision) in the foreclosure
case, declaring the stipulated 5% monthly interest to be usurious and
reducing the same to 12% per annum (p.a.). Accordingly, it ordered
Rafael to pay petitioner the amount of ₱229,200.00, consisting of the
principal of ₱160,000.00 and accrued interest of ₱59,200.00 from July
30, 1992 to September 30, 1995. 10 Records do not show that this Decision had already attained finality.
Meanwhile, prior to Rafael's notice of the above
decision, respondent agreed to pay Rafael's obligation to petitioner
which was pegged at ₱689,000.00. After making a total payment of
₱400,000.00,11 he executed a promissory note 12
dated February 20, 1998 (subject PN), binding himself to pay on or
before March 31, 1998 the amount of ₱289,000.00, "representing the
balance of the agreed financial obligation of [his] father to
[petitioner]." 13
After learning of the January 30, 1998 Decision, respondent refused to
pay the amount covered by the subject PN despite demands, prompting
petitioner to file a complaint 14 for sum of money and damages before the court a quo on July 2, 1998, docketed as Civil Case No. 98-0156 (collection case).
Issue:
WON CA is justified when it held that the doctrine of res judicata finds application in the instant case, 27 considering that both the judicial foreclosure and collection cases were filed as a consequence of the non-payment of Rafael's loan, which was the principal obligation secured by the real estate mortgage and the primary consideration for the execution of the subject PN.
Ruling:
In the present case, records show that petitioner, as creditor-mortgagee, instituted an action for judicial foreclosure pursuant to the provisions of Rule 68 of the Rules of Court in order to recover on Rafael's debt. In light of the foregoing discussion, the availment of such remedy thus bars recourse to the subsequent filing of a personal action for collection of the same debt, in this case, under the principle of litis pendentia, considering that the foreclosure case only remains pending as it was not shown to have attained finality.
While the ensuing collection case was anchored on the promissory note executed by respondent who was not the original debtor, the same does not constitute a separate and distinct contract of loan which would have given rise to a separate cause of action upon breach. Notably, records are bereft of any indication that respondent's agreement to pay Rafael's loan obligation and the execution of the subject PN extinguished by novation 40 the contract of loan between Rafael and petitioner, in the absence of express agreement or any act of equal import. Well-settled is the rule that novation is never presumed, but must be clearly and unequivocally shown. Thus, in order for a new agreement to supersede the old one, the parties to a contract must expressly agree that they are abrogating their old contract in favor of a new one, 41 which was not shown here.
On the contrary, it is significant to point out that: (a) the consideration for the subject PN was the same consideration that supported the original loan obligation of Rafael; (b) respondent merely assumed to pay Rafael's remaining unpaid balance in the latter's behalf, i.e., as Rafael's agent or representative; 42 and (c) the subject PN was executed after respondent had assumed to pay Rafael's obligation and made several payments thereon. Case law states that the fact that the creditor accepts payments from a third person, who has assumed the obligation, will result merely in the addition of debtors, not novation, and the creditor may enforce the obligation against both debtors.
As petitioner had already instituted judicial foreclosure proceedings over the mortgaged property, she is now barred from availing herself of an ordinary action for collection, regardless of whether or not the decision in the foreclosure case had attained finality. In fine, the dismissal of the collection case is in order. Considering, however, that respondent's claim for return of excess payment partakes of the nature of a compulsory counterclaim and, thus, survives the dismissal of petitioner's collection suit, the same should be resolved based on its own merits and evidentiary support.
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